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Religion has received attention as it is reported to have a strong impact on firm decision making. 
To test the impact of religiosity on the reputation risk of firm we focus on cross country data that 
has been collected from the RepRisk database from 2007 to 2018. We find that country-level 
religiosity does reduce firm reputation risk while firms in a more economically developed 
countries have less reputation risk. Firms in more religious countries face less governance risk 
but more social risk. Risk aversion and motivation for ethical practice can explain the negative 
impact of religiosity on governance risk. On the other hand, discriminative behavior toward 
minority induced from more religiosity can explain the positive relation to social risk.  Analyzing 
different dimensions of religiosity, we find belief index has significant negative impact on 
governance risk while practice index has positive impact on social risk. Our results show clear 
channel how religiosity affect ESG reputation risk. These findings would be useful for ESG 
based valuation and risk management.  
 





I want to express my gratitude to my supervisors, Dr. Min Maung and Dr. Craig Wilson. Their 
guidance has been instrumental in completion of this work. I also want to thank Dr. Hamilton 
Elkins, Dr. Fan Yang, Dr. Dev Mishra and Dr. Marie Racine for invaluable comments about the 






Permission to Use ............................................................................................................................ i 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgement ......................................................................................................................... iii 
Contents……………………………………………………………………………………..……iv 
List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. v 
1: Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 
2: Literature Review ....................................................................................................................... 5 
2.1.1 Reputation Risk .................................................................................................................. 5 
2.1.2 Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Risk ......................................................... 6 
2.2.1 Religion and Firm Decision ............................................................................................... 7 
2.2.2 Religiosity and Ethical Behavior........................................................................................ 8 
2.2.3 Dimensions of Religiosity .................................................................................................. 8 
2.3 Hypothesis Development ...................................................................................................... 9 
3: Data Description ....................................................................................................................... 12 
3.1 Dependent Variables ........................................................................................................... 12 
3.2 Test Variables ...................................................................................................................... 18 
3.3 Control Variables ................................................................................................................ 19 
3.4 Final Sample ........................................................................................................................ 20 
3.5 Empirical Models ................................................................................................................ 21 
4: Results and Analysis ................................................................................................................. 22 
4.1 Main Result ......................................................................................................................... 22 
4.2 Robustness Test ................................................................................................................... 28 
4.3 Discussion & Implication .................................................................................................... 42 
5: Conclusions ............................................................................................................................... 44 





List of Tables 
Page 
No. 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 14 
Table 3.2: Panel A: Average Religiosity and RepRisk Index by Country (Sorted by Religiosity) 15 
Table 3.2: Panel B:  Average Religiosity and RepRisk Index by Industry 16 
Table 3.2: Panel C: Average Religiosity and RepRisk Index by RepRisk Rating 17 
Table 3.3: Pearson Correlation Matrix for eight religion question 18 
Table 3.4: Pearson Correlation Matrix for all variables 20 
Table 4.1: Model with Five Religion question from Belief 22 
Table 4.2: Model with Three Religion question from Practice 23 
Table 4.3: Main Model with Peak RRI and Religiosity Index 24 
Table 4.4: Peak Component RRI and Overall Religiosity Index 25 
Table 4.5: Component of RepRisk index with Belief and Practice Index 27 
Table 4.6: RepRisk Rating Dummy and Religiosity Index 28 
Table 4.7: Current RepRisk Index and Religiosity Index 29 
Table 4.8: Current RepRisk Component Index and Religiosity Index 30 
Table 4.9: Current RepRisk Component Index with Belief and Practice Index 31 
Table 4.10: Peak RepRisk Index and Welzel Disbelief Index 32 
Table 4.11: Peak RepRisk index and Religiosity index (Excluding Countries with small 
sample) 
33 
Table 4.12: Peak RepRisk component and Religiosity index (Excluding Countries with small 
sample) 
34 
Table 4.13: Peak RepRisk component and Religion belief and practice index (Excluding 
Countries with small sample) 
35 
Table 4.14: Peak RepRisk index and Religiosity index (Excluding US Data) 36 
Table 4.15: Peak RepRisk component and Religiosity index (Excluding US Data) 37 
Table 4.16: Peak RepRisk component and Religion belief and practice index (Excluding US 
Data) 
38 
Table 4.17: Peak RepRisk index and Religiosity index (Excluding Public Administration) 39 
Table 4.18: Peak RepRisk component and Religiosity index (Excluding Public Administration) 40 









In recent years there has been a surge of research on organizational reputation. Organizations 
view reputation as the most important intangible asset and as one of the priority goals (Hofstede, 
Van Deusen, Mueller & Charles, 2002). Reputation represents a relative assessment of firms by 
stakeholders compared to competing firms (Deephouse & Carter, 2005). Using role theory, 
Jensen, Kim & Kim (2012) define reputation as a firm’s ability to meet the role expected by 
different stakeholders from the firm. Many benefits of having a good reputation are reported 
ranging from superior investor relations (Helm, 2007), better financial performance (Roberts & 
Dowling, 2002), lower cost of capital (Cao, Myers, Myers & Omer, 2015), and better recruitment 
(Turban & Cable, 2003). On the other hand, questionable behavior, termed corporate social 
irresponsibility, accounts for a firm’s bad reputation (Kang, Germann & Grewal, 2016), which 
results in lower stock returns (Gloßner, 2018) and lower merger premiums (Maung, Wilson & 
Yu, 2020). 
Most studies use signaling theory to explain the determinants of reputation (Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990). Among firm-level determinants, most studies include firm performance, size, age, and 
advertising, charitable donation which provide signals to stakeholders (Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990; Philippe & Durand, 2011). Researchers also report that reputation varies significantly 
based on country of origin (Newburry, 2012). The country-level variation is largely explained 
with institutional theory, which suggests firms in specific institutional systems tends to be 
homogenous as they follow common norms and rules set by surrounding institutions (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 2004). Economic development, institutional development, the legal system, regulatory 
framework, and national culture are suggested to be significant determinants of reputation 
(Brammer & Jackson, 2012; Deephouse, Newburry and Soleimani, 2016). Despite the interest on 
reputation, there are few empirical analysis on determinant of reputation on across countries 
(Deephouse, Gardberg & Newburry, 2019). 
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Among country-level factors, religion is reported to have a strong impact on firm decision 
making. The link between religion and a firm decision can be explained by Social Identity 
Theory which establishes people's preference and decisions are largely affected by group culture 
sharing the same identity (Tajfel, 1978; Abrams & Hogg, 2006). Azzi & Ehrenberg (1975) 
suggest religious people participate in religious services with salvation motive, for which they 
expect benefits in the afterlife. Thus, religion encourages people to be more ethical and put less 
value on monetary gain. Social norm theory suggests people behavior is largely influenced by 
social norm established by surrounding people. With this notion, legitimacy theory suggests, 
firms have an invisible social contract they must abide by. As more religious society would be 
more ethical and risk-averse, it would force firms to behave in the same manner. First, religiosity 
is linked to risk aversion for non-bank firms (Hilary & Hui, 2009), banks (Adhikari & Agrawal, 
2016), mutual fund (Shu, Sulaeman & Yeung, 2012), and hedge fund (Gao, Wang & Zhao, 
2017). Second, religion is reported to encourage ethical behavior (Longenecker, McKinney & 
Moore, 2004), avoiding questionable actions (Dyreng, Mayew & Williams, 2012; McGuire, 
Omer & Sharp, 2012). Despite so much research on religion and firm financial and investment 
decisions, there is little knowledge about religion and firm ESG reputation risk. To address this 
gap, we have analyzed how country-level religiosity affect firm ESG reputation risk.  
To test the impact of religiosity on the reputation risk of firm we focus on cross country data. 
While a firm can act as socially responsible and socially irresponsible simultaneously (Strike, 
Gao & Bansal, 2006), our study focusses on reputation risk associated with irresponsible 
behavior. To measure reputation risk data are collected from the RepRisk database from 2007 to 
2018, which reports risk index for Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) issues. Our 
sample includes firms from 29 countries over 12 years. We have analyzed factors contributing to 
the overall RepRisk index. We also run separate regression on individual components of 
RepRisk, which are environmental, social, and governance risk. To measure religiosity of 
country World Value Survey (WVS) data are used. Controlling for firm-level determinants like 
size, performance, and country-level legal origin and system, economic development, freedom of 
the press we show how country-level religiosity affects reputation risk. To measure religiosity, 
we consider eight questions from the survey related to religion. We create an overall religiosity 
index using principal component analysis from these eight questions. To address different 
dimensions of religiosity, we divide these questions into two groups. First group includes five 
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question addressing belief and affection for religion. These questions ask about the importance of 
religion in life, the importance of religion in a child, believe in God, believe in hell, and the 
importance of God in life. From these questions we construct religiosity belief index. Second 
group of questions focus on religious practice and praying in community and personal level. 
These questions are related to frequency of pray, frequency of attending religious service, and 
considering own to be a religious person. Religiosity practice index is created based on these 
questions.  
Our results show overall religiosity is negatively related to reputation risk. A significant negative 
impact is found on governance risk, but results are not significant for environmental and social 
risk component. The coefficient for the belief index is significantly negative to governance risk 
but not significant to the other two components. On the other hand, the coefficient for practice is 
significantly positive to social risk but not significant to the other two components. Our results 
are robust to alternate measures of reputation risk, alternate measures of religiosity, and change 
in the sample. We conclude firms operating in more religious countries practice more ethical 
norms and reduce governance risk. In contrary, more religious countries have more instances of 
social discrimination and higher social risk. Discrimination toward minorities increase with more 
religiosity. We find no significant relation of religiosity to environmental risk. It is evident that 
people view environmental, social and governance risk very differently. Ethical behavior 
induced from religiosity only deter questionable practice related to governance issues.  
Our paper contributes to the line of literature focusing on religiosity and determinant of 
reputation. First, this paper analyzes the impact of country-level religiosity on firm ESG 
reputation risk. Previous papers have mostly used county-level religiosity focusing on the US. 
Second, following previous papers, we made a clear contribution showing robust results that 
dimension of religiosity belief and practice have different and significant impacts on reputation 
risk. Third, while other papers have investigated reputation measuring good or general 
favourability, this study analyze determinant of reputation risk by using RepRisk dataset. The 
advantage of this measure is firms cannot dilute risk measures by doing good aggressively or 
manipulating disclosure. Fourth, major contribution of this paper is to investigate the determinant 
of environmental, social, and governance risks separately. Robust results show factors for these 
components vary significantly. While religiosity reduce overall ESG reputation risk, we find that 
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it only applies to governance risk. This paper also reports a positive impact of religiosity on 
reputation risk specifically by increasing social risk. Our findings have strong implications for 
reputation (ESG) risk management and valuation with ESG score. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains previous literature and 
hypothesis development. Section 3 discusses our data and research methodologies. Section 4 





2: Literature Review 
2.1.1 Reputation Risk 
Firms’ reputation represents how stakeholders assess firm actions on financial and non-financial 
accounts. Reputation depends on firms’ ability to fulfill the role expected from stakeholders 
(Jensen et al., 2012). It depends on firms’ actions relative to other firms as well as their past 
activities. Stakeholders formulate expectations within the institutional framework firm operates 
in. Previous studies mainly focus on three dimensions of reputation, for being known, for being 
known for something, and generalized favourability (Lange, Lee & Dai, 2011). For being known 
dimension, the familiarity of a firm and brand name is considered. In being known for something 
dimension, specific criteria like product quality, customer service is set, and firm’s relative 
position compared to competitors is assessed to measure reputation. The generalized 
favourability dimension tries to capture the net effect of good and bad actions of the firm on the 
overall perception of stakeholders. 
Many studies report reputation risk from Corporate Social Irresponsibility (CSI) has a significant 
impact on firm performance and value. Studies report firms’ irresponsible behavior can affect 
firm value, investor confidence (Jo & Na, 2012; Gregory et al., 2014). Kölbel, Busch & Jancso 
(2017) report media coverage of CSI increases firm financial risk. Kang et al., (2016) show how 
CSR and CSI affect firm performance and confirm firms face negative consequences from 
irresponsible behavior. Price & Sun (2017) analyze Corporate Social Performance by examining 
the interaction between CSR and CSI and report CSI has a longer-lasting impact than CSR. 
Sweetin, Knowles, Summey & McQueen (2013) find that consumers are willing to punish 
brands with irresponsible records thus hurt the financial performance of those firms.  
Oikonomou, Brooks & Pavelin (2012) report while CSR has a weak negative relation to risk, 
CSI has a strong positive impact on financial risk. From the perspective of market reaction, 
Veronesi (1999) find investors react more to bad news than good news. Thus, investor reaction 
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to CSI would be higher than reaction to CSR. Baloria & Heese (2018) show media coverage of 
corporate irresponsible issues put severe reputational costs on the firm. Using the RepRisk index 
our study focus solely on irresponsibility in ESG issues which is not washed out by aggressive 
responsibly actions. 
In an explanation of determinant of reputation risk, institutional theory and legitimacy theory is 
very important. Reputation can be explained with signaling theory where firms decide how to 
build their strategy. In contrast, reputation risk is largely governed by institutions and society in 
which the firm operates. Return from conforming to these norms are significantly different. For 
instance, environmental risk does not carry the same significance as other risks (Philippe & 
Durand, 2011). 
Despite growing interest in research on reputation, few papers have analyzed reputation in an 
international setting (Deephouse, Gardberg & Newburry, 2019). Using a sample of 401 
corporations from 25 countries, Deephouse et al. (2016) analyze the determinants of reputation. 
They report that reputation has a positive relation to power distance and negative relation to 
masculinity and institutional development. They concluded institutional theory helps to 
complement signaling theory explaining reputation. Researchers also show country-level 
difference in culture, economic, and regulatory structure has a strong impact on firm reputation 
(Swoboda, Puchert & Morschett, 2016; Brammer & Jackson, 2012). Barnea & Rubin (2010) 
found less insider ownership leads to more CSR expenditure suggesting the presence of agency 
conflict between shareholders. 
2.1.2 Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Risk 
Considering the reputation risk, ESG provides a clear measure of external issues affecting firm 
risk. However, the impact varies significantly among these three components. Analyzing six 
dimensions of social performance, Bouslah, Kryzanowski & M’zali (2013) conclude employee 
relation, corporate governance and community negatively affect firm risk level. 
Sharfman & Fernando (2008) show firm with better environmental performance get lower cost 
of capital. Klassen & McLaughlin (1996) report firms with positive news of environmental 
performance increase market value and vice versa. Nguyen (2018) analyzes Australian firms to 
conclude a positive relation between carbon risk and performance. 
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Orlitzky & Benjamin (2001) suggest reputation from the social performance is most significant 
in explaining firm risk. Benlemlih, Shaukat, Qiu & Trojanowski (2018) show environmental and 
social disclosure reduce idiosyncratic risk of the firm. 
2.2.1 Religion and Firm Decision 
It is well documented that religion and belief can explain individual choice and financial decision 
making. Using the Attraction–Selection–Attrition framework Schneider, Smith & Goldstein 
(2000) suggest “people make the place” and people’s attributes determines organization 
decisions. Social norm theory explains people behavior is largely influenced by norms 
established by surrounding people (Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 1990; Goldstein, Cialdini & 
Griskevicius, 2008). People behave in similar manner following social norm for reward of social 
approval and acceptance. When most people possess strong religious belief, it establishes norm 
in the society (Stavrova, Fetchenhauer & Schlösser, 2013). Religiosity as norm would influence 
people in a society to follow acceptable behavior. Previous researches report that managers 
personal trait has strong impact on firm investment and financing decision making and policy 
formulation (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Malmendier, Tate & Yan, 2011; and Cronqvist, Makhija 
& Yonker, 2012). 
Risk aversion is one characteristic largely linked to religiosity. Religious people value the 
afterlife termed as ‘salvation motive’ and thus motivated to be more ethical and less focused on 
monetary gain (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975).  Hilary and Hui (2009) report religiosity leads to 
more risk-averse practice on the organization level. They find firms in religious counties show 
lower risk exposure measured by equity return and return on asset. Adhikari and Agrawal (2016) 
report local religiosity reduces bank risk-taking with slow asset growth and local investment. 
Using data from 1996-2013 on county-level religiosity and hedge fund volatility Gao et al, 
(2017) conclude that local culture specifically religiosity have a negative impact on hedge fund 
risk-taking. Shu et al. (2012) report firms in low-Protestant or high-Catholic areas exhibit higher 
mutual fund return volatility. Callen & Fang (2015) show a negative link between stock price 
crash risk and religiosity on the county-level. El Ghoul, Guedhami, Ni, Pittman & Saadi (2012) 
find firms in more religious counties enjoy a lower cost of capital. 
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2.2.2 Religiosity and Ethical Behavior 
Studies report religiosity reduces firms’ questionable activities and deter unethical practices. 
From a survey of business managers and professionals, Longenecker et al. (2004) find 
respondents asserting the importance of religion possess a higher level of ethical standard. 
However, they find very little variation when compared among broad faith categories. Emerson 
& Mckinney (2010) show the importance of religion in a person’s life, not just affiliation to a 
religion, has a significant impact on ethical behavior. From survey data, Conroy & Emerson 
(2004) find religiosity measured by church attendance has a significant impact on disapproving 
unethical scenarios in students while religion and ethics courses do not.  
Grullon, Kanatas & Weston (2009) report firms headquartered in more religious counties are less 
likely to practice questionable activities such as backdate options, excessive compensation 
packages, and aggressive earnings management. McGuire et al. (2012) find local religiosity 
reduce financial reporting irregularities. Dyreng et al. (2012) show firms headquartered in more 
religious counties are less likely to have financial restatement and misrepresentation. 
2.2.3 Dimensions of Religiosity 
Previous researchers discuss religiosity can be viewed from different dimensions. Stark & Glock 
(1968) identify religiosity have five dimensions; 1) Experience dimension, referring to common 
experience shared from the same religion, 2) Belief dimension, referring to expectation of 
common belief about God, the afterlife, hell, and other issues, 3) Ritual dimension, involving 
public religious service attendance, 4) Devotional dimension, suggesting private religious 
practice, and 5) Intellectual dimension referring to expectation of being knowledgeable about 
one’s religion. Bjarnason (1998) mention two approaches to measuring religiosity: the religious 
belief approach focusing on religiosity arising from the belief on a personal level, and the 
religious community approach focusing on the interaction with closely-knit religious community. 
Different dimensions of religiosity have a very different impact on individual and organizational 
decision making. Weaver & Agle (2002) use the symbolic interactionist theory to analyze the 
link between religiosity and ethical behavior. They suggest a direct impact of belief and 
knowledge on ethical behavior due to ten commandment style prohibition, good Samaritan. On 
the other hand, they suggest a possible indirect impact on religiosity from rituals and practices on 
ethical practice, possibly moral values reinforced from rituals. In their paper Parboteeah, Hoegl 
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& Cullen (2008), distinguish between religious knowledge and practice. They conclude through 
more practice people would share common ideologies and moral values while knowledge of 
religion is not sufficient to induce ethical practice. Barro and McCleary (2003) find belief has a 
positive impact on economic growth while church attendance has a negative impact. They 
suggest belief is an output of religion and foster economic growth. Church attendance is input to 
religion and more attendance represent more resource used up by the religion sector resulting in 
less economic growth. 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
While previous studies focus on signaling theory to explain reputation, institutional theory can 
better address variation due to country differences. Firms tend to be homogenous in response to 
surrounding institutions including culture, the legal system, and human traits. According to 
social norm theory more religiosity in a society would establish religious norm and people would 
behave ethically. Legitimacy theory implies firms are bound by the social norms set by society it 
operates in. Studies suggest religion influence people decision and thus affect firm decision as 
well. Religiosity is believed to promote ethical behavior and risk aversions. Considering risk 
aversions and ethical practices induced by religiosity we propose our first hypothesis that firms 
in more religious regions would have a lower reputation risk. 
Hypothesis 1: Religiosity has a negative relationship with reputation risk. 
As previous studies suggest different dimensions of Religiosity have differing impact, we 
identify two dimensions. We formulate our second hypothesis to analyze whether these two 
dimensions of religiosity measure vary in impact in reputation risk. Religiosity belief measures 
individual belief, affection for religion, and related general values. With stronger belief and 
affection for religion people would be more ethical (Longenecker et al., 2004; Emerson & 
Mckinney, 2010). With more affection for religion people behave in manner which religious 
teaching encourage them to. When most people have strong belief of religion, society tend to 
establish religious norm and follow similar behavior. Belief is sufficient to create feeling of 
common identity and encourage morality. We expect negative relation of belief index with risk. 




Religiosity practice considers community level participation in religious service and individual 
praying. This measure addresses the behavioral result from religion. Practice dimension is likely 
to reinforce behavior with more interaction and norm effect. By participating in religious 
services regularly people share common behavior on community level (Parboteeah et al., 2008). 
Practice dimension of religiosity is linked to trust within group and less acceptability of different 
view (Bloom, 2012). However, people with more religious practice are likely to have less impact 
on economic decision. As they are using most of their resources for religious activities, their 
participation in firm level is reduced (Barro & McCleary, 2003). We expect religiosity practice is 
negatively related to ESG risk. 
Hypothesis 2b: Religiosity practice has a negative relationship with reputation risk. 
Reputation risk measured from ESG issues can have different impacts. Environmental, Social, 
and Governance have completely different sources. Governance component focuses on financial 
reporting, compensation issues, tax issues, bribery, and fraud. Religiosity would reduce these 
instances as it promotes ethical practices. Previous studies reported religiosity promotes 
corporate governance with better financial statement practice (Grullon et al., 2009; McGuire et 
al., 2012; Dyreng et al., 2012). We formulate our hypothesis religiosity would reduce governance 
risk. 
Hypothesis 3a: Religiosity is negatively related to governance reputation risk. 
Hypothesis 3b: Religiosity belief is negatively related to governance reputation risk. 
Hypothesis 3c: Religiosity practice is negatively related to governance reputation risk. 
On environmental components, risk aversion can reduce risks for the more religious region. Due 
to environmental risk firm face financial penalty. Religious people have more focus on afterlife 
and less concern about monetary value. Religious society would avoid environmental risk. This 
can encourage people to reduce environmental risk. However, firm do not put same value to 
environmental risk as other risk (Philippe & Durand, 2011). Alternatively speaking, if firm need 
to choose which risk to mitigate, environmental risk is not in top priorities. When firm face 
liquidity crisis for leverage, they usually cut the allocation to this risk first (Gloßner, 2018). We 
formulate hypothesis to test the impact of religiosity on environmental risk. 
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Hypothesis 4a: Religiosity is negatively related to environmental reputation risk. 
Hypothesis 4b: Religiosity belief is negatively related to environmental reputation risk. 
Hypothesis 4c: Religiosity practice is negatively related to environmental reputation risk. 
Social risk focus on human rights, social and employment discrimination, health and safety. 
Religiosity promotes trust and compassion among members which can reduce social risk. As 
religiosity encourage ethical practice, this can also promote social values. However, religious 
people tend to show adversity toward minorities and working women. With practice dimension 
these effects grow even stronger. We hypothesize religiosity have negative impact on social risk. 
Hypothesis 5a: Religiosity is Negatively related to social reputation risk. 
Hypothesis 5b: Religiosity belief is Negatively related to social reputation risk. 






3: Data Description 
3.1 Dependent Variables 
We started with RepRisk data from 2007-2018 for all available firms. RepRisk database reports a 
firm’s exposure to reputation from quantifying specific news. It collects data daily on different 
languages and quantifies risk exposure using a proprietary algorithm. The RepRisk database only 
takes consideration of negative news related to ESG issues. RepRisk dataset systematically 
identify ESG risk exposure. It measures threat to reputation for firm and takes consideration for 
one sided risk. It detects news coverage with 28 ESG topics and 45 data tags. RepRisk screens 
more than 90,000 data sources including print and online media, NGOs, and Government 
publications in 20 languages daily. RepRisk provides a large dataset from different countries that 
enable us to analyze the cross-country difference. It takes an outside in approach as they measure 
external news rather than self reporting of firm. Benefit of this data is it is not based on firms 
reporting and disclosure directly thus making it less likely to be manipulated by firms (Gloßner, 
2018). 
Starting from 2007, the RepRisk ESG platform reports the Current RepRisk Index (RRI), Peak 
RepRisk Index, RepRisk Rating, Country Sector average, and proportion of component 
responsible for RepRisk index Governance, Environmental and Social on monthly basis. The 
RepRisk index is scaled from 0 to 100 with a higher score representing more exposure to 
reputation risk. RepRisk index of 0-25 indicate low risk, 26-50 medium risk, 51-75 high risk and 
76-100 a very high-risk exposure. Whenever there is an incident of ESG related threat for firm, 
RepRisk index increases for the firm. The increase of index is proportionate to severity, reach 
and novelty of the news. Severity considers the consequences of incident (injury, death), extent 
of impact to one or group of people, and cause of incident (systematic, negligence). Reach is 
based on readership and circulation of news source as well as importance of source for specific 
country. Novelty considers whether incident is new or recurring for the firm, industry, and 
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country. After major risk incident, current RRI remains same for 14 days. If firm do not have any 
new ESG risk incidents, the score goes down over time. 
RepRisk follow several steps in processing score. First, risk incidents are identified based on 
predefined topics and data tags. Then analyst team writes risk summary report following rule-
based system. This summary considers severity, reach and novelty of incident. If same incident 
is covered in different sources, only the most influential source is taken into account.  Risk 
incidents are included only once. Risk profile is updated if story develops, covers in more 
influential source, or continue even after six weeks. Before publishing, these incidents reports go 
quality assurance process by senior RepRisk analyst. In final stage, each incident is quantified 
and RepRisk index is assigned for every firm. 
For comparing firms, RepRisk suggests using Peak RepRisk index which reports the highest RRI 
received by a firm in the past two years. Peak RRI can better capture firm's risk exposure than 
the current RRI. For this paper, we took December Peak RRI from every year to construct our 
dependent variable. For robustness tests, we include current RRI by taking the yearly average. 
While the RepRisk Index (RRI) only considers firm exposure, the RepRisk rating is assigned 
based on individual firm RRI and Country Sector Average weighting equally. Country Sector 
Average reports country and sector-related risk news exposure which can be proxy if the firm is 
missing in the RepRisk database. For RepRisk ratings we consider December ratings and create a 
dummy with 0 for low-risk exposure (AAA, AA, A) and 1 for medium and high-risk exposure 
(BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, C, D). To further investigate the impact of religion on environmental, 
social, and governance risk exposure we create variable by multiplying peak RRI with 
percentages from specific months and years the peak RRI originated from. In Table-3.1 
descriptive statistics of variables are reported for all variables. In Table-3.2 average religiosity 
and RepRisk index are reported by country, industry and RepRisk rating.  
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 
RepRisk Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median 
Peak RepRisk Index 17543 13.150 16.370 0 88 0 
Current RepRisk Index 17543 5.482 8.852 0 65.75 0 
RepRisk Rating Dummy 17543 0.380 0.485 0 1 0 
Peak Governance RepRisk Index 17496 4.979 11.003 0 72 0 
Peak Environmental RepRisk Index 17496 2.226 6.554 0 47 0 
Peak Social RepRisk Index 17496 4.369 9.674 0 63 0 
 Religiosity Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Median 
Religiosity Index 17555 -1.211 2.197 -4.460 4.907 -1.873 
Religiosity Belief Index 17555 -0.977 1.925 -3.851 3.430 -1.595 
Religiosity Practice Index 17555 -0.700 1.071 -2.203 4.188 -0.746 
Religiosity Believe        
Important quality in Child: Religious Faith 17543 27.683 21.744 1.2 84 25 
Importance of Religion in Life 17543 28.161 20.853 2.9 94.5 26 
Believe in God 17543 68.118 25.925 19 100 75.9 
Believe in Hell 17555 49.227 22.798 12.4 99.9 46.5 
How important God is in your life 17555 44.666 26.026 10.9 98.9 41.46 
Religiosity Practice        
Attend Religious Service 17543 8.997 8.554 0.5 85.2 11.5 
Religious Person 17543 49.222 24.156 12.9 97 52.1 
How often to you pray, Daily 17555 17.236 14.167 0 86.4 18.2 
Welzel Index        
Welzel Disbelief Index 17543 0.533 0.189 0.06 0.87 0.57 
Firm Level Control Variable        
Ln Total Asset 17543 7.127 1.717 -6.908 13.713 7.122 
Return on Asset 17543 0.015 0.129 -0.730 0.282 0.030 
Leverage 17543 0.165 0.188 0 0.877 0.110 
Country Level Control Variable        
Ln GDP Per Capita 17543 10.121 1.037 7.068 10.968 10.747 
Legal Origin Common Law Dummy 17543 0.513 0.500 0 1 1 
Press Freedom Index 17543 29.181 23.301 0 85.5 23.49 




Table 3.2: Panel A: Average Religiosity and RepRisk Index by Country (Sorted by Religiosity) 
  

















Morocco 31 4.846 3.126 4.155 0.076 2.548 1.274 1.274 0.000 
Jordan 23 4.252 3.344 2.641 0.138 7.696 2.939 0.926 3.831 
Ghana 8 4.103 2.995 2.889 0.093 7.875 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Malaysia 241 3.099 2.430 2.030 0.226 10.763 3.392 2.801 1.132 
Trinidad and 10 2.828 2.508 1.301 0.234 7.400 3.700 3.700 0.000 
Turkey 66 2.285 2.023 1.042 0.268 6.091 0.000 1.561 2.879 
Brazil 173 1.759 1.458 0.965 0.253 15.942 1.965 8.231 4.328 
India 767 1.557 1.366 0.713 0.227 14.349 4.759 5.109 2.847 
Romania 6 1.463 1.487 0.339 0.288 24.667 0.000 0.000 24.667 
South Africa 274 1.139 0.916 0.639 0.240 13.799 2.124 4.806 4.887 
Mexico 83 0.976 1.107 0.093 0.286 11.614 1.506 4.240 4.170 
Peru 76 0.928 1.077 0.012 0.286 13.066 2.360 6.467 3.028 
United States 6475 0.697 0.746 0.126 0.390 13.310 2.253 5.086 4.224 
Poland 59 0.681 0.722 0.047 0.235 11.593 7.269 1.206 1.322 
Cyprus 22 0.518 0.835 -0.348 0.334 9.636 0.000 5.091 2.364 
Chile 80 -0.385 0.07 -0.760 0.466 14.475 5.362 5.417 2.008 
Argentina 36 -0.407 -0.339 -0.279 0.431 6 0.194 0.194 5.611 
Thailand 48 -1.242 -0.729 -1.060 0.408 6.667 3.000 3.333 0.333 
Russia 210 -1.409 -1.188 -0.808 0.543 15.057 4.019 4.986 4.276 
New Zealand 98 -1.924 -1.695 -0.923 0.626 15.418 3.739 4.821 6.042 
South Korea 1260 -1.970 -1.793 -0.785 0.574 18.724 1.465 5.685 10.524 
Australia 704 -2.134 -1.798 -1.144 0.633 13.216 3.713 5.040 2.786 
Spain 135 -2.444 -1.933 -1.482 0.643 10.622 2.282 3.238 3.161 
Germany 398 -2.750 -2.376 -1.407 0.594 19.847 3.303 6.453 9.023 
Hong Kong 359 -2.872 -2.254 -1.707 0.712 13.092 2.667 2.615 6.528 
Netherlands 137 -2.904 -2.858 -1.006 0.650 17.693 1.546 5.040 8.663 
Japan 2892 -3.210 -2.614 -1.798 0.694 10.936 1.240 3.636 4.854 
Sweden 206 -3.555 -3.155 -1.666 0.713 15.752 1.869 6.677 4.696 







Table 3.2: Panel B:  Average Religiosity and RepRisk Index by Industry 

















Manufacturing 8055 -1.674 -1.395 -0.900 0.568 13.175 2.299 4.048 5.143 
Services 2005 -0.916 -0.703 -0.585 0.514 10.732 0.827 3.973 5.174 
Transportation, 
Communications, 
Electric, Gas and Sanitary 
service 
1751 -1.008 -0.807 -0.592 0.513 14.278 3.423 4.526 5.333 
Retail Trade 1601 -0.882 -0.669 -0.576 0.508 14.873 1.649 6.599 3.963 
Mining 1227 -1.031 -0.809 -0.642 0.524 12.068 4.838 4.385 1.744 
Finance, Insurance and 
Real Estate  
1164 0.668 0.717 0.116 0.392 12.290 0.501 3.514 6.385 
Construction 724 -1.521 -1.235 -0.859 0.538 13.733 1.299 5.017 6.918 
Wholesale Trade  672 -1.172 -0.948 -0.666 0.533 12.704 2.115 3.775 4.445 
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing 
201 -0.844 -0.753 -0.345 0.505 13.776 3.968 3.018 2.427 

























AAA 2402 -1.774 -1.412 -1.055 0.581 0.907 0.154 0.308 0.296 
AA 5852 -0.414 -0.225 -0.404 0.476 6.201 0.986 2.053 1.630 
A 2628 -1.080 -0.846 -0.655 0.523 23.941 3.692 7.930 9.785 
BBB 1697 -1.191 -1.009 -0.599 0.528 23.390 3.436 7.916 10.115 
BB 2711 -1.940 -1.694 -0.930 0.589 11.253 2.041 3.417 4.478 
B 1603 -2.231 -1.960 -1.063 0.592 20.099 4.296 5.879 7.769 
CCC 455 -1.426 -1.244 -0.692 0.539 37.079 7.324 14.628 13.496 
CC 143 -1.070 -0.907 -0.557 0.491 49.196 8.640 22.416 16.331 
C 48 -2.112 -1.900 -0.925 0.572 56.438 8.949 23.269 23.166 







3.2 Test Variables 
Data on religiosity is collected from the World Value Survey (WVS) from two waves covering our dataset available in RepRisk. WVS 
surveys many cultural and social issues at the country-level starting from 1981. They report six waves of data from which we consider 
waves from (2005-2009) and (2010-2014). We take countries which are included in both waves for our study which gave us 36 
countries. We set two waves data to 2009 and 2014 and set the same values for before and after these two points. Then we linearly 
interpolate data for the middle years (Hilary & Hui, 2009). 
We select eight questions related to religion which are the importance of religion in life, the importance of religion in child quality, 
belief in God, belief in hell, the importance of God, frequency of attending religious service, frequency of praying, and believing own 
to be religious. We used the percentage of people who answered these questions as our measure of religiosity. Table 3.3 Correlation 
matrix show all variables have a significant and high positive correlation. 
















Importance of Religion in Life 1        
Important quality in Child: 
Religion 0.970*** 1       
Believe in God 0.831*** 0.846*** 1      
Believe in Hell 0.890*** 0.891*** 0.879*** 1     
How important God is in your life 0.936*** 0.943*** 0.899*** 0.917*** 1    
Attend Religious Service 0.808*** 0.742*** 0.557*** 0.680*** 0.634*** 1   
How often to you pray, Daily 0.929*** 0.894*** 0.797*** 0.918*** 0.889*** 0.827*** 1  





We use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to construct one index for overall religiosity. The 
first principal component explains 79% of the variation in variables and the eigenvalue is 6.32 
for the first principal component while the eigenvalue is less than 1 for other components. Our 
principal first component can be representative of all questions. To measure different dimension 
of religiosity, we divide these questions into two groups. The first group consists of five 
questions importance of religion, god, religion as child quality, and believing in God and hell. 
Based on these five questions we construct a religion belief index using principal component 
analysis. Our first component explains 86% variations and has an eigenvalue of 4.29 and other 
components have less than 1. Similarly using three questions Attend religious service, praying 
frequency, and considering own religious person we construct religion practice index. For this 
first component has an eigenvalue of 2.29 (rest less than one) and explain 77% of the variation of 
three questions.  
3.3 Control Variables 
For firm-level control, we collect data from Compustat. Data of firms from the USA are 
collected from Compustat North America and combined by matching CUSIP to ISIN. Data from 
other countries are collected from Compustat Global and matched by ISIN. Data from Compustat 
Global are converted to the US dollar using the year-end exchange rate. We control for firm size, 
performance, and financial risk by using lognormal of total asset, return of asset, and long-term 
debt by the total asset (Deephouse et al, 2016). Due to extreme values in return on asset and 
leverage winsorizing was done at 1% and 99%.  
For country-level control, we use several variables. We control for economy size with Ln per 
Capita GDP collected from the World Bank. Dummy for the legal origin from common law 
countries has been used as it represents the legal system (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1999). Shareholder Right Index which represents shareholder right in major decision 
making is collected from the World Bank doing business database. This index takes value from 0 
to 6 with a higher score representing better right. As our dependent variable comes from media, 
press freedom index is used from Reporters Without Borders (RWB). This index scaled from 0-
100 with a higher score represent less freedom of the press and more hostility against journalists. 
To control for time shock and industry variation dummy for time and single-digit industry have 
been included in all models. 
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3.4 Final Sample 
After combining all data, we end up with 29 countries 17,543 firm-year observation. With 36.91% data USA represent most data 
followed by Japan and China. Although RepRisk has both listed and non-listed firms we only include firms with the International 
Security Identification Number (ISIN) to match with our control variable. The frequency of observations by country and industry is 
reported in the appendix. Table 3.4 correlation matrix shows significant correlations between country-level variables specifically with 
GDP per capita.  We have checked the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) which is below threshold 10 for all variables individually. 
Table 3.4: Pearson Correlation Matrix for all variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Peak RepRisk Index (1) 1   
          
Current RepRisk Index (2) .861*** 1            
Dummy RepRisk Rating (3) .299*** .289*** 1           
Religiosity Index (4) 0.015 .023** -.197*** 1 
         
Religiosity Belief Index (5) 0.013 .022** -.227*** 0.997*** 1 
        
Religiosity Practice Index (6) 0.019* .028*** -.111*** 0.981*** 0.964*** 1 
       
Ln Total Asset (7) 0.336*** .393*** .053*** -0.025*** -0.018* -0.042*** 1 
      
Return on Asset (8) 0.021** .037*** .127*** -0.054*** -0.059*** -0.037*** 0.248*** 1 
     




0.256*** 0.262*** 0.230*** 0.238*** -0.076*** 1 
    




0.165*** 0.198*** 0.077*** 0.116*** -0.145*** 0.178*** 1 
   






0.779*** 0.790*** 0.726*** -0.081*** -0.112*** 0.237*** 0.277*** 1 
  




-0.524*** -0.547*** -0.449*** -0.074*** 0.137*** -0.258*** -0.720*** -0.606*** 1 
 










3.5 Empirical Models 
Our base model to test hypothesis 1 starts with  
PRRI(i,t) = α + β.RELIGIOSITY(j,t)+ Firm Controli + Country Controlj + Industry fixed effect + 
Year fixed effect+ εi          (3.1) 
PRRI represents the peak RepRisk index for every firm-year observation. Religiosity is based on 
eight questions about religion. This is a country-level value with very small variation over the 
year. We expect β to be negative and significant as religiosity would reduce questionable 
practice and risk-taking. Firm control variables include total assets, return on assets, and 
leverage. We expect a positive sign for total assets as large size firms are more exposed to news. 
Performance is expected to have a negative sign while leverage is expected to have a positive 
sign. Country-level controls include per capita GDP, civil law dummy, shareholder right index, 
and press freedom index. Our peak RepRisk index is scaled between 0 and 100 with a high 
concentration in the lower limit. Hence, Tobit model regression is used for our analysis. To 
further analyze whether the source of religiosity affect results we used the following model for 
testing hypothesis 1a and 1b.   
PRRI(i,t) = α + β1.Believe(j,t)+ β2.Practice(j,t) + Firm Controli + Country Controlj + Industry fixed 
effect + Year fixed effect+ εi         (3.2) 
We expect β1 and β2 both to be negative in response to reputation risk. To check whether the 
impact of religiosity differ for component of governance, environmental and social RepRisk we 
use tobit model with each component as dependent variable individually. 
PRRI(i,t)(Governance, Environmental, Social) = α + β.RELIGIOSITY(j,t) (Believe(j,t), .Practice(j,t)) 
+  + Firm Controli + Country Controlj + Industry fixed effect + Year fixed effect+ εi (3.3) 






4: Results and Analysis 
4.1 Main Result 
We start by using religion questions individually on the peak RepRisk index. Table 4.1 shows all 
questions related to religion induced by belief. Coefficients are negative and significant which 
supports our hypothesis. Table 4.2 shows the frequency of pray and self-proclaimed religious is 
negative but insignificant while attending religious service is positive and significant which is 
against our hypothesis. The impact of religiosity from belief and practices are very different. 

































































































































































Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 
Observations 17543 17543 17543 17543 17543 
Table 4.2: Model with Three Religion question from Practice 
Dependent Variable Peak RepRisk Index Peak RepRisk Index Peak RepRisk Index 
 Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 








































































Year Dummy Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.054 0.054 
Observations 17543 17543 17543 
From Table 4.3 our main model shows overall religiosity index and religiosity believe index are 
both significant at 1%. This supports our hypothesis that countries with more religiosity have 
less reputation risk from ESG issues. Religiosity practice shows a positive but insignificant 
coefficient. It is evident that religiosity from belief has a strong impact on risk than the practice 
index. Among firm-level variables, total asset has a positive and significant coefficient 
supporting the notion that a larger firm is more exposed to risk for more visibility. Another 
explanation is stakeholders expect more from larger firms and they fail to meet high expectations 
constantly. (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001; Deephouse & Carter, 2005). Return on asset shows a 
negative coefficient significant at 1% representing firm with better performance has less risk. 
The impact of leverage on reputation risk is not significant. Among country-level variables per 
capita GDP is negatively related to firm risk suggesting that economically developed countries 
have less ESG risk. As our dependent variable comes from the media report, negative and 
significant Press Freedom Index implies countries with more restrictions on media face lower 
ESG risk index. Shareholder Right Index shows negative significant sign as better corporate 
governance would lower risk. We expect a negative sign for common law legal origin, but it 
gives a positive and significant coefficient which can be explained by higher stakeholder 
expectations from the corporation in more institutionally developed countries (Jackson & Deeg, 
2008; Sarstedt, Wilczynski & Melewar, 2013). From these results, we find evidence in support of 
Hypothesises 1 and 2a as religiosity specifically religiosity induced from belief reduce reputation 
risk. On the other hand, religiosity from practice does not have a significant impact on risk thus 
result does not support hypothesis 1b. 
Table 4.3: Main Model with Peak RRI and Religiosity Index 
Dependent Variable Peak RepRisk Index Peak RepRisk Index Peak RepRisk Index 
 Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 
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Year Dummy Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.054 0.054 
Observations 17543 17543 17543 
Now we attempt to further investigate the impact of religiosity on component of RepRisk 
governance, environmental and social proportion. Table 4.4 reports religiosity has a negative 
coefficient significant at .1%. This finding aligns with previous papers suggesting religiosity 
reduces questionable financial practice (Dyreng et al., 2012, McGuire et al., 2012). The impact 
of religiosity on the social component is positive and significant at 5% level. Guiso, Sapienza & 
Zingales (2003) report that religious people tend to be more racist and show more adversity to 
working women. As the social component focus on issues like social discrimination, workplace 
discrimination it is intuitive that religiosity would have a positive impact on social RepRisk.  
Religiosities have no significant relation to the environmental component of the RepRisk index. 
Table 4.4: Peak Component RRI and Overall Religiosity Index 








 Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 
























































Year Dummy Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.075 0.054 
Observations 17496 17496 17496 
Table 4.5 shows both belief index and practice index have negative coefficients for governance 
and environmental component but positive coefficients for social component. Believe index has 
a significant coefficient only for the governance risk component. On the other hand, practice 
index only has a significant coefficient with the social component. Thus, religiosity specifically 
the belief index reduces risk by ensuring better governance. The social component of risk 
increases with religiosity specifically induced from practice. Both indices show no significant 
relation to the environmental component. 
Among control variables, total assets have a positive coefficient and Press Freedom Index and 
per capita GDP have a negative coefficient consistently for all models. Although return on asset 
shows a negative coefficient significant at 1% level for governance and environmental 
component, the coefficient for the social component is not significant. Common law dummy 
shows a negative relation to the governance component but a positive relation to the social and 
environmental components. Common law origin countries are expected to have a better legal 
system to reduce governance risk. The shareholder right index shows a significant negative 
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impact on the governance component of risk only as more power of shareholders in major decision making would reduce the 
governance risk component. 
Table 4.5: Component of RepRisk index with Belief and Practice Index 




Peak Social RepRisk Index 






















































































































Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.067 0.075 0.075 0.054 0.054 







4.2 Robustness Test 
For robustness, we conduct several tests. We use a logit model with a dummy for RepRisk 
Rating as our dependent variable. RepRisk rating is assigned on both firm risk exposure and 
country-sector average. Table 4.6 shows our overall religiosity index is not significant. While 
belief is negatively related at a 5% level, practice is positively related at .1% significance. This 
finding is similar to our main model as belief affect negatively to reputation risk governance 
while practice affects positively to social risk component. 
Table 4.6: RepRisk Rating Dummy and Religiosity Index 






 Logit (1) Logit (2) Logit (3) 




































































Year Dummy Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.607 0.607 0.608 




Tables 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 show results using the current RepRisk index and its components. 
Current RepRisk is the annual average of the RepRisk index and components are calculated by 
multiplying the monthly RepRisk index with respective percentage. Current RepRisk ratings 
only represent last day of month index. As risk exposure can happen any day in the month this 
index does not represent whole month properly. Our results hold in all cases as earlier. 
Table 4.7: Current RepRisk Index and Religiosity Index 






 Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 


































































Year Dummy Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.067 0.067 




Table 4.8: Current RepRisk Component Index and Religiosity Index 







 Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 






















































Year Dummy Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.082 0.100 0.076 





Table 4.9: Current RepRisk Component Index with Belief and Practice Index 




Current Social RepRisk 
Index 
 Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) Tobit (4) Tobit (5) Tobit (6) 
Religiosity Belief Index -1.692*** 
(0.235) 
  -0.170 
(0.171) 
  0.067 
(0.185) 
  
Religiosity Practice Index   -0.205 
(0.354) 





































































































Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.082 0.081 0.100 0.100 0.076 0.076 







We also check robustness using an alternate measure for religiosity with the Welzel Disbelief 
Index which creates a scaled index of (0-1) for every country based on three questions regarding 
religion: the importance of religion, religious person, and attending religious service. A higher 
value of the index represents more disbelief thus less religiosity. Table 4.10 show results support 
our main model findings. 
Table 4.10: Peak RepRisk Index and Welzel Disbelief Index 










Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) Tobit (4) 












































































Year Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.068 0.075 0.054 
Observations 17543 17496 17496 17496 
 
From Table 4.2 Panel A, we can see some countries have very small frequencies. Some country 
average show 0 value for component of risk. To address this nine countries, Morocco, Jordan, 
Ghana, Romania, Trinidad and Tobago, Cyprus, and Argentina with less than 50 firm year 
observations are excluded. Table 4.11 shows overall religiosity lose significance, but all other 
results remain similar. 
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Table 4.11: Peak RepRisk index and Religiosity index (Excluding Countries with small sample) 
Dependent Variable Peak RepRisk Index Peak RepRisk Index Peak RepRisk Index 
 Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 




































































Year Dummy Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 .0538191 .0539327 .0539068 





Table 4.12: Peak RepRisk component and Religiosity index (Excluding Countries with small 
sample) 




Peak Social RepRisk 
Index 
 Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 
























































Year Dummy Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.076 0.054 
Observations 17360 17360 17360 
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Table 4.13: Peak RepRisk component and Religion belief and practice index (Excluding Countries with small sample) 
Dependent 
Variable 




Peak Social RepRisk Index 




































































































































Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.067 0.076 0.076 0.054 0.054 






Our dataset has a significant proportion of data coming from the United States (37%). For 
robustness test, we exclude US firms and run our models. Table 4.12 show overall religiosity is 
no longer significant but believes and practice index still show significant and previous sign. 
Table 4.16 show religiosity belief is now significant and positively related to social risk 
component. Signs of coefficients remain consistent in all models and robustness tests. 
Table 4.14: Peak RepRisk index and Religiosity index (Excluding US Data) 
Dependent Variable Peak RepRisk Index Peak RepRisk Index Peak RepRisk Index 
 Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 
Religiosity Index -0.412 
(0.270) 
    




Religiosity Practice Index     1.111
* 
(0.469) 
















































Year Dummy Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.054 0.054 




Table 4.15: Peak RepRisk component and Religiosity index (Excluding US Data) 




Peak Social RepRisk 
Index 
 Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 
























































Year Dummy Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.071 0.051 




Table 4.16: Peak RepRisk component and Religion belief and practice index (Excluding US Data) 




Peak Social RepRisk Index 
 Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) Model (4) Tobit (5) Tobit (6) 
Religiosity Belief Index -3.115*** 
(0.524) 






Religiosity Practice Index   0.069 
(0.762) 





































































































Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.070 0.071 0.071 0.051 0.052 






Table 4.2 Panel B show Public Administration has very high average risk index. This can happen 
as government firm and projects are more scrutinized by media. For robustness test, firms in this 
industry are excluded. Results in Table 4.17, 4.18 and 4.19 show signs and significance remain 
same as our main model. 
Table 4.17: Peak RepRisk index and Religiosity index (Excluding Public Administration) 






 Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 




































































Year Dummy Included Included Included 







Pseudo R2 0.054 0.054 0.053 




Table 4.18: Peak RepRisk component and Religiosity index (Excluding Public Administration) 






 Tobit (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) 
























































Year Dummy Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.075 0.053 




Table 4.19: Peak RepRisk component and Religion belief and practice index (Excluding Public Administration) 
Dependent 
Variable 




Peak Social RepRisk Index 




































































































































Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.067 0.075 0.075 0.053 0.054 







4.3 Discussion & Implication 
Our results strongly suggest country-level religiosity does reduce firm reputation risk. Religiosity 
affects the governance component negatively while the social component positively. The impact 
on the environmental component is not significant in any of the models. Specifically, religiosity 
measured by belief has a negative relation specifically with the governance component of 
RepRisk. In their study, Barro and McCleary (2003) report that belief in hell is positively 
associated with economic growth while attending religious service is negatively related. They 
argued belonging to a group comes from belief rather than practice. Our results are in line with 
their finding. Believe in God, hell, and the importance of religion are sufficient to create a 
feeling of belonging and encourage people to behave in more ethical way. Similar to previous 
studies reporting religiosity deter the unethical and questionable financial practice, our result 
show religiosity reduce risk only by reducing governance risk exposure. On contrary, the 
positive impact of religiosity on social risk can be attributed to the fact that religiosity is 
positively linked to racist behavior, discrimination toward minority, and adversity to working 
women (Chuah, Gächter, Hoffmann & Tan, 2016; Emerson & Smith, 2001; Guiso et al, 2003). 
These discriminative behavior increases with practice dimension of religiosity (Bloom, 2012). 
Our results are robust for change to dependent variable reputation risk measure and alternate 
measure of religion as well. We also exclude US firms to check whether the high volume of one 
country data drives our result. 
Among firm-level controls, total asset representing size is positive and significant proving 
indices are biased against large firms for their visibility and higher expectation. Return on asset 
representing performance shows a negative relation to the overall risk index. It is not significant 
to social components representing performance have no relation to this. Results suggest firms in 
a more economically developed country have less reputation risk. Due to the construction of the 
RepRisk index, the level of freedom of media has a positive relation to risk news. The legal 
origin dummy has a negative relation to governance risk but positive to overall risk index. 
Similarly, Shareholder Right Index has a negative relation to governance risk but not significant 
to other cases. 
While many previous studies relate the level of religiosity to overall risk, our study reports 
specific channels. These findings help better understand the RepRisk index and its use in 
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decision making. It is important to notice determinants have varying impacts on the 
environmental social and governance component of risk. Dimension of religiosity also have 
strong implications in the result. Our findings are relevant for managers formulating strategy for 
ESG risk management. Country level factors need to be properly addressed in ESG risk 
management. 
As ESG analysis is being incorporated in security valuation, it is important to address how 
country-level factors affect these measures. Specifically, religiosity is an important indicator of 








This study investigate relationship between country-level religiosity and firm ESG reputation 
risk. Similar to previous studies, our results support the notion that regional religiosity reduce 
firm risk. In case of ESG reputation risk, we find religiosity only reduce governance risk. Mainly 
ethical behavior induced from religiosity can be attributed to this result. The impact of religiosity 
on environmental risk is not significant. In contrary, social risk tends to increase to some extent 
with religiosity. Social discrimination towards minorities and adversity towards working women 
rises with more religiosity. It can be argued that people do not view environmental and social 
risk issues at similar level as governance risk issues from ethical viewpoint. Dimension of 
religiosity also show varying impact on risk. Belief and affection for religion is sufficient to 
promote ethical practice. On the other hand, with more institutional practice people tends to be 
less tolerant to opposing belief and foster discrimination towards minorities. Our control 
variables also provide some interesting outcome. Firm performance measured by accounting 
return is negatively related to governance and environmental risk but not significant to social 
risk. Common law origin countries and countries with higher shareholder right index have lower 
governance risk. 
We need to be careful in explaining results as RepRisk index only includes the negative news 
surfaced to people. This appropriately measures threat to reputation rather than reputation itself. 
Our findings can help to better understand reputation risk. Risk management strategies need to 
carefully address country level differences. ESG based valuations can improve by incorporating 
country level factors. By analyzing impact of religiosity controlling for firm level and country 
level variables we believe we have contributed to literature on religion and ESG risk. Future 
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